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For the past twenty years, the United States has failed to effectively 
regulate the rapidly changing technology in the offshore oil industry. 
The April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf 
of Mexico bore witness to the inadequacies that plague America’s 
offshore regulatory regime and emphasized the need for an overhaul. 
Since political compromise seems unlikely, legislative reform remains 
out of reach. However, with a bit of judicious administrative 
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rulemaking, the President could reform America’s offshore oil 
industry while avoiding protracted political battles. This 
administrative rulemaking would better protect America’s coastlines 
and force oil producers to improve their safety procedures. All this 
could be accomplished without saddling the American taxpayer with 
a big bill. Furthermore, the answer does not require reinventing the 
wheel; the solution is in a system of performance-based regulations 
already used by some other oil-producing nations, including Great 
Britain and Norway. 
Regulating the American offshore oil industry has always 
presented lawmakers with a complex set of challenges. First, the 
intricate technologies required to explore and extract oil under miles 
of ocean are constantly evolving, forcing regulators to continually 
update their drilling protocols.1 Second, many deep-sea wells are 
located in ecologically sensitive areas, requiring a high level of 
operator sophistication to safely and efficiently extract hydrocarbons.2 
Third, the lucrative nature of the oil industry creates dangerous 
financial incentives for operators and regulators alike who both seek 
to generate revenue and skirt the edge of operational disaster.3 Fourth, 
the disparate technologies required to discover, drill, and extract 
offshore hydrocarbons have resulted in multitudes of specialized 
corporations working on the same well with no clear delineation of 
authority or safety responsibility.4 The result is an industry regulated 
by a technologically deficient government agency that is attempting 
to police producers who hew to the minimum of government-
mandated safety regulations. It is an inapposite system of regulation 
in which safety takes a back seat to revenue production. 
 
1 See, e.g., Mike Paulin et al., Technology evolves for Arctic development, Feb. 1, 2011, 
OFFSHORE, http://www.offshore-mag.com (follow “Offshore’s” hyperlink; then search for 
“technology evolves for arctic development;” then follow article hyperlink) (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2011). 
2 See, e.g., Kendra Bankoff, Salazar Launches Full Review of Offshore Drilling Safety 
Issues during Visit to Oil Spill Command Centers on Gulf Coast, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Full  
-Review-of-Offshore-Drilling-Safety-Issues-during-Visit-to-Oil-Spill-Command-Centers  
-on-Gulf-Coast.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
3 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Government Cannot Halt Oil Incentives, Judge Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/business/02royalties.html 
?scp=1&sq=%22Government+cannot+halt+oil+incentives%22&st=nyt (last visited Nov. 
27, 2011). 
4 See infra text accompanying note 24. 
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The British Petroleum (BP) disaster exposed numerous deficiencies 
in the American offshore oil regulatory system. Although offshore 
drilling operations are governed by a litany of statutes,5 the regulatory 
regime enforcing the legislation has proven to be wholly ineffective. 
The problem is that legislative solutions for improving safety and 
enforcing liability for disasters are inadequate, both because of a lack 
of bipartisan support for comprehensive reform and because a 
heavily-regulated prescriptive regime will never be able to incentivize 
oil producers to rapidly incorporate technological safety advances. 
Part I of this Comment introduces the facts behind the BP disaster 
and compares the legal and legislative reactions to the Exxon Valdez 
and the Deepwater Horizon spills. Parts II–III document the 
development of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act and consider the Act’s 
effectiveness in preventing offshore spills. In Part IV, this Comment 
investigates current legislative reform efforts and explores their 
potential for effectiveness. Part V delves into the history of the 
Minerals Management Service and explains how its contradictory 
mission and subsequent regulatory failings contributed to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster. Parts VI–VIII compare and contrast 
prescriptive versus performance-based regulatory regimes, utilizing 
the British and Norwegian models as case studies. Part IX advocates 
for the implementation of a performance-based regulatory regime in 
the United States and considers the feasibility of utilizing 
administrative rulemaking to accomplish this goal. Generally, this 
Comment will touch upon how partisan legislation and overly 
prescriptive regulations have halted effective safety improvements 
and technological development in the American offshore oil industry. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
The Deepwater Horizon was constructed in 2001 and was “capable 
of operating in water up to 8,000 feet deep and able to drill down to 
30,000 feet.”6 The disaster occurred while Halliburton Energy 
Services, Inc. (Halliburton) was mounting production casing and 
 
5 See Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1987), Marine Mammals Protection 
Act § 104, 16 U.S.C. 1374 (2003), Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973), 
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act § 305(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1855 
(1976), and Coastal Zone Management Act § 307, 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1966); see also infra 
text accompanying note 83. 
6 Andrea J. Chambers & Jerry D. Brown, The 2010 Gulf Oil Spill and Questions of 
Liability, LEXIS NEXIS, Aug. 2010, at 1, available at 2010 Emerging Issues 5281. 
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cement on a 5,000 feet deep exploratory well in the Macondo 
Prospect. Ironically, integrity tests were due to be performed on the 
Macondo well at the time the explosion occurred, after which the well 
would have been capped until BP was prepared to begin extraction 
operations.7 
Tragically, the fiery explosion that occurred onboard the 
Deepwater Horizon threw BP’s plans into disarray, resulting in eleven 
deaths,8 millions of barrels of spewing oil,9 and immense damage to 
the Gulf Coast.10 The subsequent proliferation of monetary claims, 
lawsuits, and legislation11 has raised numerous issues that stand to 
forever alter the regulatory structure of the offshore oil industry12 as 
well as the liability schemes of international oil companies operating 
in the United States’ coastal waters.13 
A bill’s passage through Congress is fraught with danger at every 
turn. In general, most bills are submitted by individual members of 
Congress, examined and voted upon by specialized committees, 
presented to both the House and Senate for approval, and, finally, 
submitted to the President for his signature. Thus, a well-meaning and 
complex bill can often only gain approval through an expenditure of 
serious political capital by at least one party or the occurrence of an 
event that exerts public pressure on both political parties to react 
expediently and deal with the crisis.14 
Thus, while the Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal, Liability, and 
Compensation Act of 1989 was introduced in the immediate 
aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill,15 the Act only became law 
after a quick succession of oil spills energized Congress.16  
 
7 See id. 
8 William M. Welch & Chris Joyner, Memorial Service Honors 11 Dead Oil Rig 
Workers, USA TODAY, (May 25, 2010, 11:59 PM), available at http://www.usatoday 
.com/news/nation/2010-05-25-oil-memorial-workers_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
9 Id. 
10 See id. 
11 Chambers & Brown, supra note 6, at 1–5. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Congressional Quarterly, Approval of Liability Bills Spurred by Alaska Spill, CONGR. 
Q. ALMANAC 45:682–87 (1989). 
15 Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 
21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10119, 10119 (1991), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol21/21 
.10119.pdf. 
16 Matthew Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but Still Unconstitutional: The Oil 
Pollution Act’s Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,  
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Importantly, a large section of this bill addressed the relative dearth of 
technological development regarding oil spill response17 and 
attempted to resolve the issue by mandating research and 
technological innovation.18 
Similarly, the flurried legislative response to the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster has resulted in several proposals that aim to enhance 
technological capacities regarding oil spill response.19 The 2010 
Senate Bill 3515, introduced on June 21, 2010, is perhaps most 
relevant to this discussion; it seeks to “authorize and enhance the 
programs of the Department of the Interior relating to the detection of, 
response to, and mitigation and cleanup of oil spills on federal land 
managed by the Department, and for other purposes.”20 To do so, the 
Bill establishes an advisory board in conjunction with the National 
Academy of the Sciences, awards research grants for oil spill 
prevention and mitigation projects, authorizes a pilot program for 
periodic field tests of new oil spill response technology, and 
establishes a twenty-five million dollar per year fund to carry out the 
program.21 
The Deepwater Horizon accident has also raised several intriguing 
liability questions.22 The perplexing legal relationship between BP 
(the lessor of the Deepwater Horizon), Transocean (the owner of 
Deepwater Horizon), Halliburton Energy Services (the cement 
contractor), and Cameron International (the blowout preventer 
manufacturer) has served only to complicate the matter.23 Observers 
 
7–8 (1997) (referencing the World Prodigy spill in the Narragansett Bay, the Rachel-B 
spill in the Houston Ship Channel, and the President Rivera spill in the Delaware River). 
17 Samuel K. Skinner & William K. Reilly, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the 
President, THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM 1, 37 (May 1989), http://www.uscg.mil 
/history/webshipwrecks/ExxonValdezNRT1989Report.pdf. (“The Exxon Valdez incident 
emphasized the need for greatly improved public and private research and development 
capabilities. Current response equipment is still inadequate in less than ideal conditions. 
Better mechanical, chemical, and biological strategies for cleanup are needed. The incident 
revealed how little we know about cold-water oil spill responses.”). 
18 Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal, Liability, and Compensation Act of 1989, H.R. 
1465, 101st Cong. Title III (1989). 
19 See Department of the Interior Research and Technologies for Oil Spill Prevention 
and Response Act of 2010, S. 3515, 111th Cong. (2010). 
20 See S. 3515. 
21 Id. 
22 Roger Parloff, BP’s Gulf Coast oil spill—a legal primer, CNNMONEY, (June 6, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/04/news/companies/bp_legal.fortune/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
23 See id. 
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questioned whether BP’s liability is limited to the seventy-five 
million dollar cap under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; whether 
Transocean’s monetary liability is limited to the value of its vessel; 
and exactly who should be able to recover damages from various 
administrative funds.24 
Cognizant of the public’s rising frustration and confusion regarding 
liability, President Barack Obama forged an agreement with “BP 
Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg to create a $20 billion compensation 
fund for Gulf spill victims.”25 At the time, the fund was viewed as an 
efficient means of dispensing BP money to aggrieved parties and 
avoiding the protracted litigation that characterized the Exxon Valdez 
spill.26 
While it remains too early to judge the benefits of the BP 
compensation fund, many remain unenthused. Rhon Jones, an 
Alabama toxic torts attorney, maintains, “My belief is that it has been 
set up to save BP money by forcing claimants to make an upfront 
election of lump-sum payments in return for a full and final release of 
all claims against BP.”27 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, the former chair of the 
Alaska Oil Spill Commission, voiced his own uncertainties with the 
legal repercussions of the BP compensation fund, stating, “This whole 
blowout is a game changer, and the agreement that Obama made with 
Svanberg is unprecedented.”28 Regardless, it is critical to establish the 
background and framework of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act to 
understand the legal ramifications of the Gulf spill. 
II 
THE 1990 OIL POLLUTION ACT 
Prior to the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound off the 
Alaskan coastline, Congress remained unwilling or unable to establish 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for oil spill cleanup and 
compensation.29 Although several existing statutes provided partial 
 
24 See id. 
25 Kristin Choo, The Price of Oil: Lawyers See Both Promise and Problems in $20 
Billion Gulf Coast Compensation Fund, 96 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (Aug. 2010). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Matthew Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but Still Unconstitutional: The Oil 
Pollution Act’s Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 4 
(Fall 1997). 
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relief to oil spill victims,30 the piecemeal nature of these protections 
rendered them largely ineffective.31 Specifically, the statutes failed to 
mandate “provision[s] for recovery of cleanup-costs by states or 
private parties.”32 Thus, parties damaged by oil spill pollution were 
forced to seek relief from a hodgepodge collection of state statutes, 
admiralty suits, or common law trespass or nuisance lawsuits.33 Even 
though Congress was aware of the numerous enforcement 
inadequacies present in these statutes, it lacked the legislative will to 
enact wholesale changes.34 As mentioned earlier, Congress was only 
spurred into action following several devastating oil spills in U.S. 
coastal waters.35 
Simply put, the principal purpose of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) is 
to hold the oil industry accountable for oil spills.36 To do so, Congress 
(1) increased polluter liability for cleanup and damages, (2) 
established the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and enlarged the role of 
the federal government in overseeing cleanup operations, (3) 
mandated scientific development for pollution prevention, and (4) 
allowed states to increase oil spill liability beyond the proposed limits 
contained in the OPA.37 
The OPA increased polluter liability through several measures. 
First, it imposed strict liability for cleanup costs and damages 
resulting from spills while also enlarging the class of people who 
 
30  See id. at nn.4–9 and accompanying text. 
31 Id. at 1, 4–5 (discussing the effectiveness of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1924, the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, the Water Improvement 
Act of 1970, and the Clean Water Act). 
32 Id. at 5. 
33 See generally Stephen E. Roady, Remedies in Admiralty for Oil Pollution, 5 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 361 (1977) (explaining how private claimants, in the absence of a state created 
cause of action or a direct suit against the polluters' insurers, are frequently frustrated in 
their hopes of recovery for damages resulting from spills); see also Firemen's Fund Ins. 
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 339 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1964) (upholding a trial court judgment 
that the City of Los Angeles and others were liable for negligent operation of an oil 
pipeline). 
34 See Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good 
Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10333 (1989) (providing a 
historical account of three decades of inadequate oil spill legislation); see generally Roady, 
supra note 33; and Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 283 (1993) (describing how the Exxon Valdez disaster pushed 
Congress to unanimously enact OPA). 
35 Randle, supra note 15, at 10121, 10133. 
36 Id. at 10120. 
37 Id. 
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were eligible for recompense.38 However, the OPA also limited 
polluters’ liability in several key areas to avoid driving out oil 
producers. For example, the liability of vessels carrying over 3,000 
gross registered tons is restricted to ten million dollars for removal 
costs and damage payments.39 Critically, the OPA enforces absolute 
liability when the spill occurs due to the “willful negligence or willful 
misconduct” of the responsible party, which includes contractors or 
vessel lessees.40 Furthermore, the OPA liability cap is lifted if the 
offending party, while in breach of a federal regulation, proximately 
causes the oil spill.41 The complete defenses for such spills are also 
quite minimal, including “(1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, or (3) 
an act or omission of a third party, not including an agent, servant, 
employee, or contractor.”42 
Second, the OPA supersedes all existing compensation funds and 
combines them into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF). Thus, 
the Act encourages the quick and effective distribution of funds to 
expedite cleanup efforts.43 Third, the OPA forces the federal 
government to “coordinate and direct all public and private cleanup 
efforts whenever there is a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to 
the public health or welfare.”44 Finally, the Act attempts to reduce oil 
spills and improve the response efforts of the federal government by 
requiring double-hulled vessels for large oil tankers, mandating 
 
38  Vincent J. Foley, Post-Deepwater Horizon: The Changing Landscape of Liability 
for Oil Pollution in the United States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 515, n.30, 525 (2010–2011). The 
OPA has been interpreted to provide for strict liability because it charges “each 
responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the 
substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining 
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone [as] liable for the removal costs and damages.   
. . .” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1996). 
But see Andrew B. Davis, Pure Economic Loss Claims Under the Oil Protection Act: 
Combining Policy and Congressional Intent, 45 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS. 1, 23–25 (2011) 
(discussing ambiguities in legislative history). 
39 Randle, supra note 15, at 10123. For example, a 300,000-ton tanker would have a 
liability limit of $360 million ($1,200 x 300,000 = $360,000,000), while a non-tank vessel 
of 20,000 tons, such as a grain vessel or container ship, would have a limit of twelve 
million dollars ($600 x 20,000 = $12,000,000). Non-tank vessels have lower limits of 
liability because they pose less of a danger of a catastrophic spill. See also 33 U.S.C. § 
2704(a)(2) (1996). 
40 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1994). 
41 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B) (1996). 
42 Harrington, supra note 16, at 11 (referencing 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)–(3) (1996)). 
43 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(i) (1990). 
44 S. Rep. No. 101-94, at 8 (1989) (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729). 
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innovation and improvements in oil spill response technology, and 
revising pilotage laws.45 
But what has the OPA accomplished? In 1999, Admiral James M. 
Loy of the United States Coast Guard highlighted several safety 
improvements before Congress, including: (1) a two-thirds decline in 
the number of spills over 10,000 gallons, (2) a sixty-four percent drop 
in the rate of oil spills per million gallons of oil shipped, and (3) no 
single spills of over one million gallons in U.S. waters.46 While these 
numbers are certainly impressive and indicate that the OPA has 
succeeded to some extent, the National Research Council, a nonprofit 
policy institute,47 tellingly foretold that “a single major spill would 
dramatically affect the statistics and significantly alter the trends 
portrayed by the Coast Guard.”48 Of course, such a spill did occur and 
subsequently shattered the safety record so feted by the Coast Guard. 
Paradoxically, the positive decline of U.S. oil spills over the last 
fifteen years has also lowered our readiness to respond to such 
incidents.49 In 2004, the United States Coast Guard conducted a Spill 
of National Significance (SONS) exercise and damningly concluded: 
Oil spill response personnel did not appear to have even a basic 
knowledge of the equipment required to support salvage or spill 
cleanup operations . . . . There was a shortage of personnel with 
experience to fill key positions. Many middle-level spill 
management staff had never worked a large spill and some had 
never been involved in an exercise. As a result, some issues and 
complex processes unique to spill response were not effectively 
addressed.50 
 
45 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2734 (1994); see also Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 
9302(b) (1994). 
46 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard 
and Maritime Transp. and Water Resources and Env't of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 26–28 (1999) (Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, 
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard). 
47 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.nationalacademies.org/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
48 Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 488 
(2000). 
49 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, 
GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 28 (2010). 
50 Id. (citing U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, California 
SONS 2004: After Action Report 46 (Sept. 2004). 
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Perhaps the most worrisome failure of the OPA is the low level of 
funding for the OSLTF.51 When Congress created the OSLTF in 
1986,52 it failed to allocate funding until the Exxon Valdez spill 
spurred it into action.53 The OSLTF is financed partially through an 
eight or nine cent per barrel tax on the United States oil industry,54 but 
this provision expired in December of 1994 and was not reenacted 
until April 2005. Unsurprisingly, according to a 2010 Congressional 
Research Service report, the OSLTF “the risk of a major oil spill 
remains.”55 Another bad tiding for the future safety of the oil industry 
that emphasizes the need for comprehensive regulatory reform was 
illustrated in a 2007 U.S. Department of Homeland Security report 
that stated: 
[T]he vast oil production industry infrastructure is aging, including 
oil wells, refineries, leaking underground storage tanks, and 
pipelines. A great number of oil wells that were drilled (onshore and 
offshore) have been depleted and are now abandoned, most with no 
identifiable responsible party. Many of these pollution sites are 20 
to 50 years old—pre-dating current state regulatory programs—and 
have not been properly maintained.56 
Thus, because tanker liability is limited by the size of its oil 
holdings,57 a spill of similar size to the Exxon Valdez has the real 
capacity to exceed the value of the fund.58 Of course the twenty 
billion dollar BP fund has, to some extent, circumvented this 
particular issue.59 
Therefore, the OPA of 1990 remains an imperfect instrument—one 
that should be consistently updated as environmental concerns 
increase, technology advances, and U.S. oil supply and demand 
fluctuates. Although Congress remained relatively content with their 
 
51 Id. at 19. 
52 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (1986). 
53 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 13. 
54 26 U.S.C. § 9509; see also Ramseur, supra note 49, at 19. 
55 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 20–21. 
56 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 10 (2007). 
57 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 20–21. 
58 Id. 
59 See Choo, supra note 25; but see Moira Herbst, BP Fund, Feinberg Face Lawsuits by 
Claimants, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 
/02/28/us-oil spill-feinberg-idUSTRE71R7JH20110228 (detailing allegations that Kenneth 
Feinberg, the administrator of the BP compensation fund, has systematically sought to 
“delay, deny, [and] defend” claims in order to force injured parties into “grossly 
inadequate” settlements). 
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1990 OPA efforts for over a decade, a few recent provisions have 
attempted to address the aforementioned liability and safety 
concerns.60 
As mentioned earlier, Congress renewed the five-cent-per-barrel 
tax on all U.S. oil in 2005 and, more importantly, increased the 
OSLTF budget to $2.7 billion.61 In 2007, Senate Bill 184 mandated 
increased pipeline inspections, H.R. 2830 reduced the time period for 
which OSLTF claims could be submitted from six to three years, and 
Senate Bill 1620 required some oil carriers to demonstrate their 
financial capacity to pay for prospective spills.62 As of yet, none of 
these bills have passed muster in either the House or Senate. Thus, 
while Congress seems to be aware of many of the limitations of the 
1990 OPA, it lacks the political will to enact helpful changes. This 
Congressional malaise highlights the problems surrounding effective 
oil spill reform and emphasizes the need for a creative administrative 
approach that avoids the boondoggling of politicians. 
III 
THE DANGERS OF OFFSHORE OIL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS 
Interestingly, spills from oil extraction operations such as the 
Deepwater Horizon only account for approximately one percent of 
the total oil spillage per year in North American coastal waters.63 
However, while well blowouts occur infrequently, when they do 
occur they typically spew millions of gallons of oil into fragile 
ecosystems.64 The overwhelming majority of these spills take place in 
the ecologically fragile Gulf of Mexico.65 Furthermore, the National 
Research Council, a scientific consortium that studies environmental 
issues, “estimates that oil spills from operations in state waters 
 
60 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 10–12. 
61 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. Once the $2.7 
billion cap on the OSLTF fund is reached, the tax ceases until the fund needs to be 
replenished. 
62  See RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 14–15. 
63 Id. at 29 (utilizing data from NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. OF 
SCI., OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, AND EFFECTS 69 (The National Academies Press 
2003)). 
64 Id. at 32. 
65 Spills, Statistics, and Summaries 1996–2011, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/spills1996-2011.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
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account for twice the oil discharges of activities in federal waters.”66 
While some states have wholeheartedly embraced the preemption 
clause of the OPA and enacted more stringent guidelines than those 
contained in federal legislation,67 the high number of state water 
incidents presents a great hazard to businesses and ecologies clustered 
along the coast.68 
IV 
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
Since the Deepwater Horizon spill in April of 2010, both the 
House and Senate have been under pressure to respond to the 
disaster.69 As a result, several bills are currently in various states of 
Congressional approval. First, on July 30, 2010, the House passed the 
Consolidated Land, Energy and Aquatic Resources Act (CLEAR), 
which “would add restrictions on offshore drilling and beef up 
response safety and liability provisions in current law.”70 The Senate 
has also drafted a similar bill, the Clean Energy Jobs and Oil 
Company Accountability Act of 2010,71 which indicates that both 
parties may be willing to compromise and send a united bill to 
President Obama after the August recess.72 The Senate bill, drafted by 
Majority Leader Harry Reid, includes four major proposals: (1) 
elimination of the seventy-five million dollar liability cap for 
economic damages, (2) incentives for natural gas and electric 
 
66 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 33 (referencing NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., supra note 63, 38). 
67 1999: Fewer Spills, But in the Wrong Places at the Wrong Times, OIL SPILL 
INTELLIGENCE REP. (Cutter Info Corp., Arlington, Mass.), Jan. 13, 2000, at 1. (noting that 
Washington, California, and Maine have created their own guidelines for oil spill liability 
and tanker safety). 
68 RAMSEUR, supra note 49, at 6–7. 
69 Svend Brandt-Erichsen & Adam Orford, House Enacts Amendments to Oil Pollution 
Act, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; Measure Awaits Senate Action, MARTEN LAW, 
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100802-house-enacts-amendments (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2010). 
70 S. Res. 3663, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010). 
71 Id. 
72 See generally Brandt-Erichsen & Orford, supra note 69; but see infra text 
accompanying notes 75–79. 
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vehicles, (3) implementation of the Home Star Retrofit Act of 2010,73 
and (4) reforms to the Land and Water Conservation Fund.74 
Both bills have the potential to bring about major changes in oil 
spill liability and safety. However, significant opposition has arisen to 
the unlimited liability provisions of the Senate bill,75 prompting 
counterproposals that would require each offshore lease holder “to 
carry insurance to a level determined by the Secretary of Interior 
through a public rulemaking process, subject to a minimum of $250 
million,” amongst other provisions.76 Of course, any legislative action 
would have to pass both the House and the Senate, a result that seems 
more and more unlikely considering the recent Republican takeover 
of the House.77 Williams & Jensen, PLLC, a leading District of 
Columbia law firm that specializes in lobbying,78 recently concluded 
that bipartisan legislative action regarding the BP oil spill was “not 
probable” in 2011.79 
Unfortunately, most political efforts aimed at reforming the 
technological and regulatory nature of the offshore oil drilling 
industry remain inexorably tied to spill liability reform, effectively 
handcuffing the passage of comprehensive legislation. Therefore, to 
truly improve the safety and technological prowess of the American 
offshore oil industry, a fresh approach is imperative. 
V 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE: THE HISTORY AND FAILINGS 
OF A CONFLICTED AGENCY 
The first significant federal touchstone for regulating offshore 
production of American hydrocarbons was laid with the passage of 
 
73 EFFICIENCY FIRST: AMERICA’S HOME PERFORMANCE WORKFORCE, http://www 
.efficiencyfirst.org/home-star/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (describing a rider amendment 
to 2010 S. 3663, which would incentivize improvements in residential efficiency). 
74 Memorandum from Frank Vlossak, Williams & Jensen, PLLC, Oil Spill Legislation: 
Prior Action and Outlook 1, 1 (Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
75 Id. at 2 (referring to Senator Mark Begich’s (D-AK) proposal on oil spill liability). 
76 Press Release, Mark Begich, Begich Proposes Oil Spill Shared Liability Bill (Aug. 6, 
2010), available at http://begich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2010/8/begich-proposes-oil   
-spill-shared-liability-bill. 
77 Vlossak, supra note 74, at 2. 
78 See generally WILLIAMS & JENSEN, http://www.williamsandjensen.com/?flash=false 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
79 Vlossak, supra note 74, at 1. 
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the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.80 This legislation, 
which was to be subsequently developed and refined throughout the 
years, gave the federal government and the Department of the Interior 
control of submerged land three miles off the U.S. coastline.81 
However, even as federal control over offshore development 
expanded, so too did its environmental responsibilities.82 The primary 
vehicle for environmental legislation took form in the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which was signed into law on 
January 1, 1970.83 NEPA “established a national policy to protect the 
environment, created a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and 
required that environmental impact statements be prepared for major 
federal actions having a significant effect on the environment.”84 
Although environmentalists could be pleased with their efforts in 
attaining the passage of NEPA, the oil embargo of the early 1970s 
heralded another shift in American energy policy.85 As advocates for 
American energy independence pushed for greater exploration and 
use of offshore resources, “many coastal states, local governments, 
fishermen, and environmentalists—sought . . . to ensure that offshore 
oil and gas leasing complied with strict safeguards . . . .”86 Thus, the 
federal government was left with two competing mandates: (1) utilize 
the vast profit potential of offshore submerged lands to achieve 
 
80 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING 57 (2011) [hereinafter DEEP WATER] (citing Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a). 
81 Id. The passage of this bill was an extraordinary development for federal control of 
the submerged continental shelf. Deep Water details how many states bitterly contested 
federal control of offshore land. See also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); 
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 
(1950). Indeed, the presidential candidates of the day debated the issue at length. See DEEP 
WATER, supra note 80, at 57–58. 
82 See DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 59 (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370H; see also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 70 (2004) (listing eighteen statutes concerning environmental 
regulations)). Unsurprisingly, legislative calls for heightened environmental regulations 
came about, at least in part, as a reaction to the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill on January 
28, 1969. See DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 58–59. 
83 Alvin L. Alm, NEPA: Past, Present, Future, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, (Jun. 8, 2011) http://epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/nepa/01.html. 
84 Id. 
85 The 1973 oil embargo prompted President Richard Nixon to propose “a dramatic 
expansion of offshore oil and gas development, including in frontier areas around most of 
the nation’s coast.” See DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 59. 
86 Id. at 60. 
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energy independence, and (2) maintain the environmental purity of 
American water and air resources for future generations. 
In 1978, these two divergent policy goals were actualized in the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments.87 The amended Act 
of 1978 “fundamentally transformed federal offshore leasing” by 
detailing the “procedures governing the leasing of rights to explore, 
develop, and produce the resources of the outer continental shelf.”88 
Simultaneously, the Act required the Secretary to both undertake 
“environmental studies” to determine the impact of offshore 
hydrocarbon development and to “obtain a proper balance between 
the potential for environmental damage, the potential for discovery of 
oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal 
zone.”89 
Interestingly, the amended Act also required developers to 
incorporate “the use of the best available and safest technologies 
which the Secretary [of the Interior] determines to be economically 
feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant 
effect on safety, health, or the environment.”90 Critically, these 
regulations could be ignored so long as the Secretary of the Interior 
determined that the safety improvements they brought were 
insufficient to justify costs of implementing the technology.91 This 
special exemption would later come to have implications for every 
single offshore drilling operation in American coastal waters. 
As the federal government began to taste the rich fruits that 
offshore leasing could bring,92 it sought to streamline and enhance the 
notoriously inefficient royalty collection process.93 Thus, in 1982, 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 208-
18(3)–(4)(b)(3), 92 Stat. 629 (1953) (amended 1978); 43 U.S.C.A.1331 (1954) (West 
2011). 
90 DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 62 (quoting interview with Coast Guard official Nov. 
12, 2010). 
91 Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. §1347(b) (2007)). 
92 A 1980 lease sale in New Orleans netted almost three billion dollars in cash for 
federal government coffers, and also demonstrated a viable method of raising money 
without raising taxes. At this point, revenues from oil and gas royalties “had already 
become the second largest revenue source for the U.S. Treasury.” See DEEP WATER, supra 
note 80, at 63. 
93 Id. at 63–64. 
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Congress passed the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act.94 
This Act required the Secretary of the Interior to “establish a 
comprehensive inspection, collection and fiscal and production 
accounting and auditing system” to determine and collect royalties 
from oil and gas extraction operations on federal lands.95 
Furthermore, the Act called upon the Secretary to establish inspection 
procedures for the extraction sites to ensure that the relevant federal 
rules and regulations were upheld.96 
On January 19, 1982, Secretary of the Interior Watt created the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS).97 The MMS was organized 
into two branches: (1) the Offshore Energy and Minerals 
Management Program, which was responsible for regulating offshore 
drilling, and (2) the Minerals Revenue Management program, which 
was responsible for revenue collection from offshore leasing 
activities.98 For the first time, a single agency was responsible for 
regulating offshore leases and collecting the revenue that such leases 
generated.  The seeds of the BP disaster were sown. 
Following passage of the Amended Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act, Secretary Watt swiftly set about expanding offshore leasing 
operations and attempted to open up nearly one billion acres on the 
outer continental shelf for development.99 Furthermore, the special 
exemption, which had been utilized mainly in the Gulf of Mexico, 
“gradually became a policy of allowing offshore drilling, as a 
practical matter, almost only in the Gulf.”100 
 
94 Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 
2447 97th Cong. (2nd Sess.), available at http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/PubLaws 
/PDFDocs/97-451.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
95 Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1711 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/30/usc_sec_30_00001711----000-.html (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2011). 
96 Id. 
97 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 
HISTORY OF THE MMS, http://www.boemre.gov/jobs/Assets/PDF/MMSOverview.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
98 See DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 65. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 66. Proposed drilling leases off the Californian, Oregonian, and Alaskan 
coasts have been met with fierce opposition and lawsuits throughout the years, which 
increased the popularity, and use of the special exemption, in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 
63; see also TYLER PRIEST, THE OFFSHORE IMPERATIVE: SHELL OIL’S SEARCH FOR 
PETROLEUM IN POST WAR AMERICA, 220–21 (Joseph A. Pratt ed., Texas A&M University 
Press 2007). 
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Throughout the 1980s, a series of deadly accidents rocked the 
international offshore drilling industry.101 These accidents prompted 
large-scale changes in the regulatory structure of the United Kingdom 
and Norway (as will be detailed later in this Comment) and also 
prompted the MMS to review its own regulations.102 In 1989, the 
agency commissioned a task force to review its regulatory program, 
which concluded that “MMS’s emphasis on a list of ‘potential 
incidents of non-compliance’ could lead to an attitude on the part of 
an operator that compliance with the list equals safety, thereby 
diminishing ‘recognition of [the operator’s] primary responsibility for 
safety.’”103 The task force urged the MMS to, amongst other things, 
upgrade its outdated inspection lists, focus on operational procedures 
and human error factors instead of hardware compliance, and increase 
facility inspections.104 
Regrettably, these recommendations were ignored as the Exxon 
Valdez disaster had already captivated the focus of the nation and its 
legislators.105 Undeterred, the MMS pushed forward and even 
attempted to implement its own version of the safety case,106 dubbed 
the safety and environmental management program. Unfortunately, 
industry opposition and agency malaise combined to leave these 
proposals dead in the water.107 Instead of effective regulatory reform, 
the federal government saddled the MMS with even greater duties108 
without the concomitant rise in funding that its responsibilities 
demanded.109 
Throughout the 1990s, the MMS’s authority and efficiency, as a 
regulatory agency, were continually weakened through a combination 
of a lack of funding, increasing responsibilities, and a siphoning of 
 
101 DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 68–69 (referencing the Ocean Ranger disaster in 
Newfoundland, the sinking of the Alexander Kielland in the North Sea, and the Piper 
Alpha explosion in Scotland). 
102 Id. The MMS was also pushed to review its own procedures following a platform 
explosion off the Louisiana coast on March 19, 1989, which resulted in the loss of seven 
lives. 
103 Id. at 70. (citing MARINE BOARD, ALTERNATIVES FOR INSPECTING OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OPERATIONS 80 (1990)). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 70–71. 
107 DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 71. 
108 Following passage of the OPA, the MMS’s responsibilities were expanded to 
include “oil spill response planning and prevention.” Id. at 70–74. 
109 Id. at 72–73. 
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decision-making ability.110 Instead of working as a regulator of the 
offshore oil industry, it sought to “approach [its] relationship with the 
offshore industry more as a partner than a policeman.”111 
Furthermore, the MMS failed to update its safety requirements to 
account for the major technological innovations that had enabled 
producers to expand their operations further away from land or the 
expanding use of contractors by oil companies.112 In sum, the MMS 
had been weakened and captured by the very industry it sought to 
regulate. 
On April 20, 2010, two decades of inadequate funding, legislative 
inattention, and technological stagnation were exposed with 
catastrophic results. In hindsight, the jaded observer will not question 
why the Deepwater Horizon disaster occurred, but rather why it did 
not occur sooner. To truly learn and improve from these harsh 
lessons, a completely fresh regulatory approach is required. 
VI 
PRESCRIPTIVE VS. PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION 
In July of 1988, the United Kingdom offshore oil-drilling industry 
was rocked by an explosion and subsequent fire onboard the Piper 
Alpha platform, located over 100 miles off the northeast coastline of 
Scotland.113 In the aftermath of the disaster, the British government 
ordered an inquiry into the reasons for the conflagration.114 
Interestingly, instead of mandating increased government regulations, 
Lord Cullen (the chair of the inquiry) concluded: 
Many existing regulations are unduly restrictive in that they are of 
the type which impose “solutions” rather than “objectives” and are 
out of date in relation to technological advances. This poses a clear 
danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety 
considerations; and that sound innovations are discouraged.115 
 
110 Id. at 70–74. 
111 DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 71–72. 
112 Id. at 73–74. 
113 British Broadcasting Company, 1988: Piper Alpha Oil Rig Ablaze, BBC ON THIS 
DAY, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/6/newsid_3017000/3017294 
.stm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
114 Rob Grant et al., Potential for Performance-Based Regulation in the Canadian 
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, 44 ALBERTA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (referencing U.K., 
Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster). 
115 U.K., DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE PIPER ALPHA 
DISASTER (Chair: Lord Cullen) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1990) [Cullen 
Report], at para. 21. 
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Thus, while the Cullen Report did spur the British government to 
provide its offshore oil drilling regulatory organization with new 
powers,116 it also directed it to utilize performance-based regulations 
instead of prescriptive guidelines.117 
But what exactly is the difference between prescriptive and 
performance-based regulations? Well, prescriptive regulations are 
those that “specifically describe the means to achieve the objective. 
Establishments must all meet the regulatory requirement in the same 
way. The government [then] verifies information from regulated 
establishments and conducts compliance inspections.”118 
In contrast, performance-based regulation “sets performance goals, 
and allows individuals and firms to choose how to meet them.”119 
Under this approach, “the implementation of [performance-based 
regulation] has the potential to facilitate technological innovation and 
efficient use of resources, [and] increase industry initiative in 
developing and implementing plans of action and self-audits . . . .”120 
Most importantly, performance-based regulations enable the 
organizations with the best access to the latest technology—in this 
case the oil companies—to implement industry safeguards while still 
maintaining regular production standards. 
In contrast, a prescriptive regulatory regime is forced to continually 
update itself with safety innovations and technological improvements, 
all the while lacking the technical nous that accompanies daily 
operation of an oil rig. Of course, charging offshore oil producers 
with the responsibility of setting and maintaining their own safety 
standards involves a significant amount of risk, both environmentally 
and politically. Thus, a mixed prescriptive/performance-based regime 
stands the best chance to simultaneously improve safety, spur 
technological development, and avoid the piecemeal and ineffective 
 
116 See Offshore Safety Act, 1992, 15 (U.K.) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1992/15/introduction. 
117 S. Nelson et al., How the World’s Most Comprehensive Goal-Setting Regulatory 
Regime Works: A Model of the UKCS Regulatory System and its Unique Implications for 
MODUS (Paper presented at the SPE/IADC Drilling Conference, Amsterdam, 4–6 March 
1997), Society of Petroleum Engineers publication SPE/IADC 37686, at 921. 
118 Drugs and Health Products Glossary, HEALTH CANADA, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca 
/dhp-mps/consultation/blood-sang/gloss-eng.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
119 CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., REGULATORY POLICY PROGRAM REPORT NO. RPP-03, 
PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS IN HEALTH, SAFETY, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (2002), available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu 
/publications/getfile.aspx?ID=63. 
120 See Grant et al., supra note 114, at 3. 
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legislative boondoggle that currently characterizes American efforts 
to regulate its offshore oil industry. 
VII 
THE BRITISH REGULATORY REGIME 
As mentioned earlier, the British government implemented its 
current offshore oil regulatory scheme in response to the Piper Alpha 
disaster of 1988.121 The centerpiece of Lord Cullen’s 
recommendations, which now serves as the backbone of British 
offshore oil safety regulations, is the “Safety Case.”122 Taken literally, 
each oil producer is required to prove the safety of its proposed 
installation to the Health and Safety Executive, specifically detailing 
the following: 
[T]hat [1] an adequate Safety Management System (SMS) be in 
place, such that the design and the operation of the installation and 
its equipment were safe; that [2] the potential major hazards of the 
installation and the risks to personnel thereon be identified and 
appropriate controls provided; and that [3] a Temporary Safe 
Refuge (TSR) and means for a full and safe evacuation, escape, and 
rescue be provided.123 
Furthermore, each installation operator must renew its safety case 
every three years or, alternatively, when its extraction operation 
undergoes a substantial change.124 Two terms are critical to the legal 
enforcement of the safety case: “reasonable practicability” and “as 
low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).125 “Reasonable 
practicability” requires oil operators to balance the “degree of risk” 
for operating individual installations with the costs of maintaining a 
high level of safety.126 More importantly, “an [oil operator’s] ability 
to afford the measures is not considered relevant . . . the burden of 
proof in the courts for [proving] reasonable practicability is on the [oil 
 
121 See BRITISH BROADCASTING COMPANY, supra note 113, at 1; see also Grant et al., 
supra note 114, at 4. 
122 See Grant etal., supra note 114, at 6. 
123 Id. at 5; see also Kenneth Miller, Piper Alpha and the Cullen Report, 20 IND. L.J. 
176, 183 (1991). 
124 See Grant et al., supra note 114, at 7 (citing S.I. 1992/2885 [OSCR]). 
125 Id. at 6. 
126 Id. (citing Anne Sharp, Regulating Higher Hazards: Exploring the issues 
(PowerPoint presentation and transcript from the Workshop on Prescriptive vs. 
Performance-based Regulatory Regimes for the Canadian Off-Shore Petroleum Industry at 
the Oil and Gas Administration Advisory Council Conference (OGAAC), St. John’s, 
Newfoundland 1, 16–17 (Oct. 2000)). 
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operator], not on the prosecuting of authorities.”127 Second, ALARP 
simply refers to the acceptable level of risk that each oil extractor 
must achieve.128 
These vast regulatory changes did not come without a financial 
cost, of course. Because oil extractors were now burdened with 
conducting advanced risk assessment studies to establish their safety 
case, they had to expend significant capital on hiring independent 
safety consulting firms.129 Furthermore, additional costs were accrued 
when installations were forced to comply with the ALARP principle. 
All in all, the British oil industry has spent approximately eight billion 
dollars on safety innovation and renovation since the Piper Alpha 
disaster.130 More importantly, the British regulatory system has 
achieved a high level of operational safety and has maintained the 
production standards of its industry operators.131 
VIII 
THE NORWEGIAN REGULATORY REGIME 
Unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, Norway’s shift 
towards a performance-based regulatory regime did not occur as the 
result of a single offshore accident. Rather, as industry activity began 
seriously ramping up in the mid-1970s, the Norwegian government 
found that it was unable to sufficiently monitor oil producers.132 
Consequently, the Norwegian parliament “gradually changed the 
profile of the supervisory function towards an increased focus on the 
internal control systems in the licensees’ organizations.”133 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 8. 
130 Id. at 6. 
131 See Statistics, HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore 
/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
132 Magne Ognedal, The Goal-Setting Approach to Regulatory Supervision: The 
Experience of a Safety and Working Environment Regulator, Workshop on Prescriptive vs. 
Performance-based Regulatory Regimes for the Canadian Offshore Petroleum Industry at 
the Oil and Gas Administration Advisory Council Conference, St. John’s, Newfoundland, 
16–17 (Oct. 2000) (on file with author); see also Thor Gunnar Dahle, The Norwegian 
Approach to Safety in the Offshore Petroleum Activity, 7 J. LOSS PREVENTION PROCESS 
INDUSTRIES 379, 379 (1994), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science 
/article/pii/0950423094800537. 
133 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS TECHNOLOGY, Composite Materials for 
Offshore Operations: Proceedings of the First International Workshop, (Oct. 1993), 
http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/185/185AA.pdf. 
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Essentially, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, the main oil 
regulatory agency, “became more concerned about how decisions 
with impact on safety and working conditions were taken, and less 
concerned about what the decisions actually were.”134 While the 
Norwegian regulatory system did not fully embrace a performance-
based approach overnight, it now utilizes an installation approval 
scheme comparable to the British model that is commonly called “risk 
analysis.”135 
In the Norwegian system, the government establishes industry wide 
safety goals, and each operator must conduct a risk analysis on his 
installation to determine how to achieve and maintain these standards 
over the long term.136 The operator then submits his risk analysis to 
the government, and must demonstrate that “safety measures are 
adapted to the specific risks inherent to its activities and that they 
comply with the safety objectives contained in the safety 
regulations.”137 In contrast to the now defunct American regulatory 
regime, in which one agency was responsible for maintaining offshore 
environmental standards and collecting revenue, the Norwegian 
system utilizes two independent agencies: the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD) and the State Pollution Control Authorities 
(SPCA).138 These agencies collaborate to define and enforce 
Norwegian regulatory requirements, as directed by their parliament.139 
There are a few notable benefits to this approach. First, the risk 
analysis system recognizes that certain drilling operations are 
ecologically riskier than others and mandates the implementation of 
heightened safety measures to reduce this risk.140 Thus, “the 
probability of having an accidental oil spill must be lower when 
drilling in an environmentally vulnerable area[,] [such as the Barents 
Sea,] to balance the fact that potential consequences of such events 
are more serious than in other areas.”141 Interestingly, NEPA also 
 
134 Dahle, supra note 132. 
135 U.A. Kjellen, The New Risk Analysis Regulations From the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate: Their Applicability to the Control of Occupational Accidents in Design, 
SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS [SPE] 23277 at 644. 
136 Ingrid Arstad, Regulations Concerning Risk Analysis and their Application in 
Environmental Safety Protection in Norway, 29 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 330, 331 
(1994). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 330–31. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 331. 
141 Id. at 332. 
ORTH 1/10/2012  9:15 AM 
2011] Administering America’s Offshore Oil Fields 531 
requires companies to submit a “development and production plan” 
for approval by the Secretary of the Interior142 that details the 
“environmental safeguards to be implemented” for individual 
leases.143 However, oil companies consistently bypass this safety 
provision by invoking the special Gulf of Mexico exemption, thus 
eliminating its potential effectiveness.144 
Second, the clear delineation of duties between the NPD and the 
SPCA has produced a streamlined system of regulatory promulgation 
and enforcement. In it, the NPD is largely responsible for regulating 
accidental oil pollution while the SPCA is responsible for regulating 
normal oil discharges and spill response efforts.145 While these 
agencies are independent of each other and serve separate functions, 
their 
co-operation enables [them] to cover an area of competence and 
experience that contributes to a more integral understanding of 
environmental challenges in petroleum activities, and, therefore, a 
better regulation of environmental protection and a more efficient 
supervision of the industry.146 
The NPD and SPCA’s clear delineation of regulatory responsibility 
contrasts starkly with the MMS’s impossibly broad range of duties. 
Quite frankly, the MMS was overwhelmed by its contradictory 
responsibilities for revenue collection and enforcement, impeded in 
its reform efforts by both the federal government and the oil 
industry,147 and hampered in its safety reform efforts by its lack of 
technological nous.148 
While the Norwegian offshore oil regulatory system is certainly not 
perfect, its success in creating site-specific safety procedures is quite 
impressive. The risk analysis approach, which relies on the oil 
industry to incorporate advances in safety technology and risk 
 
142 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1978). 
143 Id. at (c)(3). 
144 See supra text accompanying note 102. 
145 See Arstad, supra note 136, at 330–31. 
146 Id. at 333. 
147 Since the early 1990s, the American Petroleum Institute, a de facto lobbying arm of 
the American oil industry, has actively hampered the MMS’s efforts to adopt a risk based 
regulatory system. See DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 71. The MMS has also faced 
periodic opposition from the federal government, leading one senior MMS official to liken 
the agency’s negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget as “pulling teeth.” 
Id. at 72 (quoting E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff (Sept. 2, 2010); E.P. 
Danenberger, e-mail message to Commission staff (Oct. 25, 2010)). 
148 See id. at 73. 
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perception in their offshore operations, has fostered a cooperative yet 
mindful relationship between its oil producers and the agencies that 
regulate them. The American offshore regulatory system can and 
should implement a similar approach adapted to the unique ecology 
and hydrocarbon potential of the Gulf of Mexico. 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
The offshore oil industry is a critical element of America’s 
domestic energy supply. Offshore oil and gas currently account for 
one-third of the United States’ hydrocarbon production, a figure that 
will most likely increase in the coming years.149 According to the 
Energy Information Administration, the outer continental shelf 
“contains an estimated 85 billion barrels of oil in technically 
recoverable resources—more than all onshore resources and those in 
shallower state waters combined.”150 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted the dangers that 
accompany offshore extraction of hydrocarbons. The loss of life and 
the environmental destruction that occurred on April 20, 2010, will 
long live in both the ecology of the Gulf and the memory of the 
American public. For the time being though, oil remains a cornerstone 
of the American economy and the American way of life. Thus, 
legislators will continue to allow oil extraction on American land, and 
oil companies will continue to seek out and extract hydrocarbons 
wherever they may lie. The challenge, therefore, is creating a 
workable system of enforcement and risk management. While current 
efforts have failed, an efficient and effective regulatory regime 
remains eminently feasible. 
This Comment details the extreme risks that the federal 
government assumed when it allowed the MMS to be captured by the 
very industry it was directed to regulate.151 The lack of technical 
expertise, adequate funding, and decision-making ability that afflicted 
the MMS necessitates a completely fresh approach to regulating the 
offshore oil industry. Although at least one scholar has written 
 
149 See Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2010, 75 (Apr. 
2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2010).pdf. 
150 DEEP WATER, supra note 80, at 294 (emphasis in original) (citing Energy 
Information Agency Annual Energy Review 2008 (June 26, 2009), tbl.4.1, at 99, 
http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT /multifuel/038408.pdf). 
151 See supra Part V. 
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extensively regarding the regulatory potential of an independent 
advisory board,152 this author believes that the implementation of a 
performance-based regulatory regime provides the federal 
government with the most efficient and cost-effective method of 
preventing catastrophic spills. 
Unfortunately, the inherently dangerous nature of the offshore 
drilling industry means that there is no surefire process of eliminating 
costly and deadly accidents. When deep-sea accidents do occur, the 
results can be particularly catastrophic. However, this inexorable fact 
should not deter policy makers from completely altering regulatory 
schemes that have been proven ineffective. The United Kingdom 
safety case and the Norwegian risk analysis approaches are 
established regulatory regimes that have succeeded in preventing 
large-scale disasters like the Deepwater Horizon. Furthermore, these 
regulatory regimes have effectively shifted the safety burden to the oil 
producers, maintaining a high level of technological expertise and 
fostering a culture of “safety first.” 
Additionally, since performance-based regimes are so well 
established in offshore drilling operations around the world, “there is 
reasonable assurance that the major operators . . . would apply . . . the 
same skills and sophistication that they are accustomed to applying in 
the other jurisdictions, and with similarly satisfactory results.”153 
While compliance with such a regime in American waters might 
temporarily increase operational costs154 as it did in the British 
offshore industry,155 the safety and technological improvements 
would undoubtedly outweigh those costs. 
Of course, the question remains: How can an ineffective legislature 
possibly institute such sweeping changes? Administrative rulemaking 
offers one solution, as it does not require legislative approval by 
either the House or the Senate. However, there are some limitations to 
 
152 See generally Memorandum from Professor Jody Freeman of Harvard Law School 
to Nat’l Commn on the BP Deepwater Horizon, etc., Structural Options for Improving 
MMS/BOEM Decision Making on Offshore Drilling (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.scribd 
.com/doc/40642315/Jody-Freeman-Presentation-on-Structural-Options-for-MMS-BOEM. 
Professor Freeman’s excellent memorandum “describes structural options for better 
integrating scientific, engineering and other technical expertise into Minerals Management 
Service/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (MMS/BOEM) decisions related to 
offshore drilling through more robust interagency consultation and independent review by 
outside experts.” Id. at 1. 
153 Grant et al., supra note 114, at 31. 
154 See id. at 31–32. 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
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this approach. First, “all economically significant regulatory actions 
(defined as potentially having an impact on the economy of $100 
million) and other ‘significant’ regulatory actions by executive branch 
agencies must be submitted for OIRA [Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs] review before becoming final.”156 While the exact 
financial impact of a performance-based regime on the American 
economy is still undetermined, it would most likely exceed this 
measure. 
Second, administrative rulemaking lacks some of the stability and 
congressional oversight that accompanies statutory actions.157 It is 
also unclear whether the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor to the now-
defunct MMS, would be able to institute adequate financial penalties 
for breach of its regulations. Third, any attempt at significant 
administrative rule making by BOEMRE would most likely have to 
be approved by OIRA,158 an organization “historically focused 
primarily on cost-benefit analysis.”159 
However, these potential obstacles to change must be balanced 
against the proven dangers of not changing at all. The ecological 
damage, loss of life, and citizen outrage that occurred as a result of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster should serve as an impetus for 
revamping the regulatory regime currently administering the 
American offshore oil industry. 
 
 
156 Freeman, supra note 152, at 7 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, at § 6(a)(3)(A)–(C)). 
157 Id. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 156. 
159 Freeman, supra note 152, at 8. Professor Freeman notes: “[T]he current regulatory 
review process may not be optimally suited to reviewing risk assessment, operational 
design, spill response and other technical elements of drilling plans. . . .” Id. 
